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In order to demonstrate unconscious
visual processing, researchers need to
select a technique for rendering stimuli
invisible and a measure reflecting the pro-
cessing of these stimuli. The most popu-
lar techniques are backward masking, in
which the visibility of a very brief stim-
ulus is degraded by the presentation of a
succeeding visual pattern (Breitmeyer and
Ög˘men, 2006), and interocular suppres-
sion, where a stimulus shown to one eye
degrades the visibility of a stimulus pre-
sented to the other eye (Lin and He, 2009).
Recently, much work has been carried
out using continuous flash suppression
(CFS; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005), a partic-
ularly potent interocular suppression tech-
nique. In CFS, a train of high-contrast
patterns flashed into one eye can sup-
press the visibility of a stationary stimulus
shown to the other eye for up to several
seconds (Figure 1). Because CFS allows
for extended periods of reliable invisibil-
ity of complex stimuli, this technique has
sparked a surge of interest in unconscious
visual processing.
Ideally, research aimed at delineating
the scope and limits of visual process-
ing without awareness should adopt the
technique that is most sensitive to uncon-
scious processing. This is because a failure
to find evidence for a certain unconscious
effect could always be due to constraints
imposed by the specific technique rather
than to the genuine absence of uncon-
scious processing (Faivre et al., 2012).
However, since the extent to which a tech-
nique allows for unconscious processing is
difficult to determine, and due to a lack
of general consensus on valid measures of
unconscious processing, no definite crite-
ria exist for choosing the most sensitive
technique.
CLASSIC DISSOCIATION APPROACHES
TO UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING
Most commonly, unconscious processing
is studied using some variant of the clas-
sic dissociation paradigm, in which a
direct measure of stimulus awareness (e.g.,
subjective ratings or objective discrimi-
nation performance) is contrasted with
an indirect measure of stimulus process-
ing (e.g., priming effect). For this com-
parison to be valid, both measures need
to be obtained using identical stimuli
and stimulus-response mappings, and the
direct task needs to assess awareness of
the critical stimulus manipulation that is
driving the effect in the indirect measure
(Schmidt and Vorberg, 2006). Thus, the
only difference between the two measures
should lie in the task instructions, with
the direct task referring explicitly to the
critical stimulus manipulation (Reingold
and Merikle, 1988). Schmidt and Vorberg
(2006) described three types of dissocia-
tions that can provide evidence for uncon-
scious processing, depending on some
critical assumptions: (1) The direct mea-
sure has null sensitivity while the indirect
measure has some sensitivity. This simple
dissociation requires the direct measure to
capture all aspects of relevant conscious
perception. (2) The indirect measure has
greater sensitivity than the direct measure.
This sensitivity dissociation requires the
direct measure to be at least as sensitive to
relevant conscious perception as the indi-
rect measure. (3) Some manipulation has
opposite effects on the indirect and the
direct measure. Such double dissociations
may provide themost compelling evidence
for the existence of two distinct underly-
ing processes (Mattler, 2003; Vorberg et al.,
2003; Lau and Passingham, 2007).
The majority of studies adopting the
classic dissociation paradigm followed the
simple dissociation logic, probably due to
its face validity and practical feasibility.
This approach has provided clear evidence
for high-level visual and semantic uncon-
scious processing under backward mask-
ing (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; Van den
Bussche et al., 2009). Under interocular
suppression, by contrast, unconscious pro-
cessing seems to be comparably limited
(Tong et al., 2006; Almeida et al., 2008;
Lin and He, 2009). For example, a num-
ber of studies have failed to obtain evi-
dence for unconscious processing of facial
features rendered invisible through CFS
(Moradi et al., 2005; Shin et al., 2009;
Yang et al., 2010; Amihai et al., 2011;
Stein and Sterzer, 2011; Stein et al., 2012a;
but see Adams et al., 2010; Xu et al.,
2011; Barbot and Kouider, 2012). This
indicates that backward masking repre-
sents a more sensitive technique for mea-
suring unconscious high-level processing
than interocular suppression.
BREAKING CONTINUOUS FLASH
SUPPRESSION (b-CFS)
This notion has recently been challenged
by findings obtained with the novel break-
ing continuous flash suppression (b-CFS)
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FIGURE 1 | Competing models of the processes mediating detection
performance in the b-CFS paradigm. (A) The single-process model
posits that both the CFS and the control condition measure differences
between stimuli in accessing awareness that exist independent of the
application of CFS, i.e., that are caused by non CFS-specific processing
differences (green boxes and bars). The bar graphs on the right show
how the single-process model would account for hypothetical detection
differences (Detection in arbitrary units) between two stimuli in the
CFS condition (top) and in the control condition (bottom). To account for
simple and sensitivity dissociations, the single-process model would
need to assume that the CFS condition represents a more sensitive
measure of non CFS-specific processing differences than the control
condition. The single-process model cannot account for double
dissociations. (B) The dual-process model posits that differences in
conscious detection between stimuli obtained in the CFS condition are
at least partly due to the application of CFS, i.e., they reflect
CFS-specific processing differences (red boxes and bars). In the b-CFS
literature, simple and sensitivity dissociations between the CFS and the
control condition have been take to support the dual-process model. The
dual-process model assumes that CFS-specific processing accounts for
effects that are larger in the CFS than in the control condition, as
illustrated by the red bar graphs on the right. We, however, suggest
that double dissociations between the two conditions (i.e., some
experimental manipulation has opposite effects on detection in the CFS
and the control condition) are required to refute the single-process
model and to postulate distinct CFS-specific processing.
paradigm in which differential uncon-
scious processing during CFS is inferred
from the time different stimuli need to
overcome CFS and break into awareness,
as reflected in speeded localization (or
detection) responses (Jiang et al., 2007).
A rapidly growing body of literature using
b-CFS now suggests that interocular sup-
pression allows for a much greater extent
of high-level unconscious processing than
previously thought (for a review, see Gayet
et al., submitted). For example, b-CFS is
sensitive to various features of face stim-
uli (Jiang et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007;
Zhou et al., 2010; Stein et al., 2011b,c,
2012b, 2014; Chen and Yeh, 2012; Stein
and Sterzer, 2012; Stewart et al., 2012;
Gobbini et al., 2013a,b), and can even be
influenced by semantic stimulus proper-
ties (Costello et al., 2009; Mudrik et al.,
2011; Sklar et al., 2012). These findings
demonstrate that b-CFS is highly sensitive
to differences between complex stimuli in
their potency to gain access to awareness.
However, detection or localization
responses as used in b-CFS represent a
measure of conscious stimulus process-
ing. In the classic dissociation paradigm
b-CFS would thus count as a direct mea-
sure of stimulus awareness. Why then is
b-CFS typically regarded as a measure of
unconscious processing? One possibility
is that, because target stimuli in b-CFS
remain invisible for up to several sec-
onds, differences in detection time may
seem to suggest that the visual system
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discriminates between stimuli before con-
scious access, i.e., unconsciously. However,
the same logic could in principle be
applied to any visual detection measure
(Gaillard et al., 2006). Consequently,
findings from all experiments measur-
ing visual detection, such as tasks designed
as awareness checks, paradigms for mea-
suring contrast detection thresholds,
visual search, or attentional blink would
need to be reinterpreted as evidence for
unconscious processing. Clearly, this inter-
pretation is in direct contradiction to
a long history of research into uncon-
scious processing that adopted the classic
dissociation logic.
Alternatively, and more likely, is that
unconscious processing is inferred from b-
CFS only because CFS is used to degrade
stimulus visibility. That is, differences in
access to awareness are attributed to differ-
ential processing that occurred specifically
under CFS, i.e., to CFS-specific process-
ing differences. For this reasoning to be
valid, non CFS-specific threshold differ-
ences need to be ruled out as a cause for
differences in access to awareness. To iso-
late CFS-specific processing, most b-CFS
studies contrasted detection performance
under CFS with a binocular control con-
dition. This control condition implements
the same detection task as the CFS con-
dition, but stimuli are presented binoc-
ularly, with the target stimulus gradually
blended in on top of the flashing masks.
The control condition is intended to cap-
ture all non CFS-specific processing dif-
ferences that could play a role in the CFS
condition.
A PROCESS-DISSOCIATION
FRAMEWORK FOR b-CFS
Thus, the b-CFS paradigm aims to show a
dissociation between the CFS and the con-
trol condition in order to provide evidence
that CFS-specific processing drives detec-
tion performance in the CFS condition.
That is, b-CFS studies attempt to refute a
single-process model in favor of a dual-
process model. The single-process model
posits that detection performance in both
the CFS and the control condition reflects
non CFS-specific processing (Figure 1A).
By contrast, the dual-process model posits
that detection performance in the CFS
condition is at least partly mediated by
CFS-specific processing (Figure 1B). This
dissociation logic is markedly different
from the classic dissociation paradigm
described above, in that both the CFS and
the control condition are direct measures
that use different stimuli but identical
tasks.
To date, b-CFS studies have inferred
CFS-specific unconscious processing when
an effect was found in the CFS condi-
tion but none in the control condition
(simple dissociation) or when the effect
in the CFS condition was larger than in
the control condition (sensitivity dissocia-
tion). These dissociations require the con-
trol condition to be at least as sensitive as
the CFS condition to all aspects of non
CFS-specific processing that might have
contributed to the effect in the CFS condi-
tion. We have recently shown that this crit-
ical assumption is unwarranted, because
the CFS and the control condition are not
directly comparable and differ in various
aspects other than CFS-specific process-
ing (Stein et al., 2011a). Thus, simple or
sensitivity dissociations could be due to
factors other than CFS-specific processing.
In fact, it is possible that the CFS condi-
tion is simply a more sensitive measure of
non CFS-specific differences in stimulus
detectability than the control condition.
Hence, simple and sensitivity dissociations
cannot provide unequivocal evidence for
CFS-specific processing.
However, a double dissociation between
the CFS and the control condition could
be used to directly refute the single-process
model. The only assumption required is
that non CFS-specific processing differ-
ences influence the CFS and the con-
trol condition in the same direction.
If some experimental manipulation had
opposite effects on detection in the CFS
and the control condition, this would be
inconsistent with the notion that non
CFS-specific processing differences were
driving the effect in both conditions.
Therefore, a dual-process model would
be required to fit the data. To illus-
trate, if an accuracy-based, criterion-free
sensitivity measure revealed that under
CFS neutral words were detected better
than negative words (for response time
based evidence, see Yang and Yeh, 2011),
whereas in the control condition nega-
tive words were detected better than neu-
tral words, this would establish a double
dissociation.
Although double dissociations would
provide convincing evidence that distinct
processes mediate detection in the CFS
and the control condition, opposite effects
in the CFS and the control condition
may be the exception rather than the
rule and thus difficult to obtain in prac-
tice. Moreover, while double dissociations
establish the dissociation of processes,
the labels (“conscious” vs. “unconscious”)
assigned to these processes need to be
postulated a priori (Cardoso-Leite and
Gorea, 2010). Evidence for a separate pro-
cess governing detection under CFS would
thus not necessarily imply that this pro-
cess takes place unconsciously. We never-
theless believe that the demonstration of
double dissociations is essential for prov-
ing the dual-process model of b-CFS and
may thus represent the critical first step
on the road to a new direct measure of
unconscious processing.
OBJECTIVE vs. SUBJECTIVE
MEASURES IN b-CFS
Another way of studying unconscious
processing that is fundamentally differ-
ent from the classic dissociation logic is
to contrast a direct measure of objec-
tive discrimination performance with
a direct measure of subjective aware-
ness, such as confidence ratings. On
this approach, unconscious processing
is inferred when the subjective measure
has null sensitivity while the objective
measure has some sensitivity (blindsight-
like simple dissociation; Kolb and Braun,
1995; Kunimoto et al., 2001), or when the
objective measure has greater sensitivity
than the subjective measure (sensitiv-
ity dissociation; Sandberg et al., 2011).
Following this objective-subjective disso-
ciation logic, future b-CFS studies could
collect, on every trial, criterion-free mea-
sures of objective and subjective sensitivity
rather than response time based detection
measures. Dissociations between direct
objective and subjective measures would
demonstrate unconscious processing and
could be compared to the magnitude of
objective-subjective dissociations obtained
with other psychophysical techniques,
such as backward masking (Kanai et al.,
2010).
With appropriate stimulus manipu-
lations, objective-subjective dissociations
in b-CFS could also be used to probe
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the extent of unconscious processing. For
example, demonstrating greater sensitiv-
ity to neutral than negative words in the
objective measure (cf. Yang and Yeh, 2011)
while showing null sensitivity to both neu-
tral and negative words in the subjective
measure could be regarded as evidence for
unconscious processing of word meaning.
Although the objective-subjective disso-
ciation logic for measuring unconscious
processing is still under development and
an agreement on a valid, bias-free mea-
sure of subjective awareness has yet to
be reached (Evans and Azzopardi, 2007;
Sandberg et al., 2010; Maniscalco and Lau,
2012; Barrett et al., 2013), we believe
that this approach represents a promising
future application for b-CFS.
CONCLUSION
For the time being, b-CFS cannot pro-
vide evidence for unconscious processing.
We therefore suggest that findings from
b-CFS that were originally taken as evi-
dence for the processing of “invisible” or
“unconscious” stimuli need to be rein-
terpreted as evidence for differences in
mere stimulus detectability. Only studies
adopting the well-established classic disso-
ciation paradigm can provide unequivocal
evidence for unconscious processing and
guide the choice of the most sensitive
psychophysical technique for rendering
stimuli invisible.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Philipp Sterzer and Timo Stein were
supported by the German Research
Foundation (grants STE 1430/6-1 and
STE 2239/1-1).
REFERENCES
Adams, W. J., Gray, K. L. H., Garner, M., and Graf,
E. W. (2010). High-level face adaptation without
awareness. Psychol. Sci. 21, 205–210. doi: 10.1177/
0956797609359508
Almeida, J., Mahon, B. Z., Nakayama, K., and
Caramazza, A. (2008). Unconscious processing
dissociates along categorical lines. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 105, 15214–15218. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
0805867105
Amihai, I., Deouell, L., and Bentin, S. (2011).
Conscious awareness is necessary for processing
race and gender information from faces.Conscious.
Cogn. 20, 269–279. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.
08.004
Barbot, A., and Kouider, S. (2012). Longer is no better:
nonconscious overstimulation reverses priming
influences under interocular suppression. Atten.
Percept. Psychophys. 74, 174–184. doi: 10.3758/
s13414-011-0226-3
Barrett, A. B., Dienes, U., and Seth, A. K. (2013).
Measures of metacognition on signal-detection
theoretic models. Psychol. Methods 18, 535–552.
doi: 10.1037/a0033268
Breitmeyer, B. G., and Ög˘men, H. (2006). Visual
Masking: Time Slices Through Conscious and
Unconscious Vision. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198530671.
001.0001
Cardoso-Leite, P., and Gorea, A. (2010). On the
perceptual/motor dissociation: a review of con-
cepts, theory, experimental paradigms and data
interpretations. Seeing Perceiving 23, 89–151. doi:
10.1163/187847510X503588
Chen, Y. C., and Yeh, S. L. (2012). Look into my
eyes and i will see you: unconscious processing of
human gaze. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 1703–1710. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2012.10.001
Costello, P., Jiang, Y., Baartman, B., McGlennen, K.,
and He, S. (2009). Semantic and subword priming
during binocular suppression. Conscious. Cogn. 18,
375–382. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.02.003
Evans, S., and Azzopardi, P. (2007). Evaluation of a
bias-freemeasure of awareness. Spat. Vis. 20, 61–67
doi: 10.1163/156856807779369742
Faivre, N., Berthet, V., and Kouider, S. (2012).
Nonconscious influences from emotional faces: a
comparison of visual crowding, masking, and con-
tinuous flash suppression. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
3:129. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00129
Gaillard, R., Del Cul, A., Naccache, L., Vinckier, F.,
Cohen, L., and Dehaene, S. (2006). Nonconscious
semantic processing of emotional words modu-
lates conscious access. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
103, 7524–7529. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0600584103
Gobbini, I., Gors, J. D., Halchenko, Y. O., Hughes, H.
C., and Cipolli, C. (2013a). Processing of invisi-
ble social cues. Conscious. Cogn. 22, 765–770. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2013.05.002
Gobbini, I., Gors, J. D., Halchenko, Y. O., Rogers,
C., Guntupalli, S., Hughes, H., et al. (2013b).
Prioritized detection of personally familiar faces.
PLoS ONE 8:e66620. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.
0066620
Jiang, Y., Costello, P., and He, S. (2007). Processing
of invisible stimuli: advantage of upright faces
and recognizable words in overcoming interoc-
ular suppression. Psychol. Sci. 18, 349–355. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01902.x
Kanai, R.,Walsh, V., and Tseng, C. H. (2010). Subjetive
discriminability of invisibility: a framework for
distinguishing perceptual and attentional failures
of awareness. Conscious. Cogn. 19, 1045–1057. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2010.06.003
Kolb, F. C., and Braun, J. (1995). Blindsight in
normal observers. Nature 377, 336–338. doi:
10.1038/377336a0
Kouider, S., and Dehaene, S. (2007). Levels of
processing during non-conscious perception: a
critical review of visual masking. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 362, 857–875. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2007.2093
Kunimoto, C., Miller, J., and Pashler, H. (2001).
Confidence and accuracy of near-threshold
discrimination responses. Conscious. Cogn. 10,
294–340. doi: 10.1006/ccog.2000.0494
Lau, H., and Passingham, R. E. (2007). Unconscious
activation of the cognitive control system in
the human prefrontal cortex. J. Neurosci. 27,
5805–5811. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4335-
06.2007
Lin, Z., and He, S. (2009). Seeing the invisible: the
scope and limits of unconscious processing in
binocular rivalry. Prog. Neurobiol. 87, 195–211.
doi: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2008.09.002
Maniscalco, B., and Lau, H. (2012). A signal detec-
tion theoretic approach for estimating metacogni-
tive sensitivity from confidence ratings. Conscious.
Cogn. 21, 422–430. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.
09.021
Mattler, U. (2003). Priming of mental operations by
masked stimuli. Percept. Psychophys. 65, 167–187.
doi: 10.3758/BF03194793
Moradi, F., Koch, C., and Shimojo, S. (2005). Face
adaptation depends on seeing the face. Neuron 45,
169–175. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2004.12.018
Mudrik, L., Breska, A., Lamy, D., and Deouell, L. Y.
(2011). Integration without awareness: expanding
the limits of unconscious processing. Psychol.
Sci. 22, 764–770. doi: 10.1177/09567976114
08736
Reingold, E. M., and Merikle, P. M. (1988). Using
direct and indirect measures to study percep-
tion without awareness. Percept. Psychophys. 44,
563–575. doi: 10.3758/BF03207490
Sandberg, K., Bibby, B. M., Timmermans, B.,
Cleeremans, A., and Overgaard, M. (2011).
Measuring consciousness: task accuracy and
awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus dura-
tion. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 1659–1675. doi: 10.
1016/j.concog.2011.09.002
Sandberg, K., Timmermans, B., Overgaard, M., and
Cleeremans, A. (2010). Measuring consciousness:
is one measure better than the other? Conscious.
Cogn. 19, 1069–1078. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.
12.013
Schmidt, T., and Vorberg, D. (2006). Criteria for
unconscious cognition: three types of disso-
ciation. Percept. Psychophys. 68, 489–504. doi:
10.3758/BF03193692
Shin, K., Stolte, M., and Chong, S. C. (2009). The
effect of spatial attention on invisible stimuli.
Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 71, 1507–1513. doi:
10.3758/APP.71.7.1507
Sklar, A. Y., Levy, N., Goldstein, A., Mandel, R., Maril,
A., and Hassin, R. R. (2012). Reading and doing
arithmetic nonconsiously. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 109, 19614–19619. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1211
645109
Stein, T., Hebart, M. N., and Sterzer, P. (2011a).
Breaking continuous flash suppression: a new
measure of unconscious processing during inte-
rocular suppression? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:167.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00167
Stein, T., Peelen, M. V., and Sterzer, P. (2011b). Adults’
awareness of faces follows newborns’ looking pref-
erences. PLoS ONE 6:e29361. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0029361
Stein, T., Peelen, M. V., and Sterzer, P. (2012a). Eye
gaze adaptation under interocular suppression.
J. Vis. 12:1. doi: 10.1167/12.7.1
Stein, T., Senju, A., Peelen, M. V., and Sterzer, P.
(2011c). Eye contact facilitates awareness of
faces during interocular suppression. Cognition
119, 307–311. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.
01.008
Stein, T., Seymour, K., Hebart, M. N., and Sterzer,
P. (2014). Rapid fear detection relies on high
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 387 | 4
Stein and Sterzer Unconscious processing
spatial frequencies. Psychol. Sci. 25, 566–574. doi:
10.1177/0956797613512509
Stein, T., and Sterzer, P. (2011). High-level face shape
adaptation depends on visual awareness: evidence
from continuous flash suppression. J. Vis. 11, 5.
doi: 10.1167/11.8.5
Stein, T., and Sterzer, P. (2012). Not just another face
in the crowd: detecting emotional schematic faces
during continuous flash suppression. Emotion 12,
988–996. doi: 10.1037/a0026944
Stein, T., Sterzer, P., and Peelen, M. V. (2012b).
Privileged detection of conspecifics: evidence
from inversion effects during continuous
flash suppression. Cognition 125, 64–79. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.005
Stewart, L. H., Ajina, S., Getov, S., Bahrami, B.,
Todorov, A., and Rees, G. (2012). Unconscious
evaluation of faces on social dimensions. J. Exp.
Psychol. Gen. 141, 715–727. doi: 10.1037/a00
27950
Tong, F., Meng, M., and Blake, R. (2006). Neural bases
of binocular rivalry. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 502–511.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.003
Tsuchiya, N., and Koch, C. (2005). Continuous
flash suppression reduces negative afterimages.
Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1096–1101. doi: 10.1038/
nn1500
Van den Bussche, E., Van den Noortgate, W., and
Reynvoet, B. (2009). Mechanisms of masked prim-
ing: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 135, 452–477.
doi: 10.1037/a0015329
Vorberg, D., Mattler, U., Heinecke, A., Schmidt,
T., and Schwarzbach, J. (2003). Different time
courses for visual perception and action priming.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 100, 6275–6280. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0931489100
Xu, S., Zhang, S., and Geng, H. (2011). Gaze-induced
joint attention persists under high perceptual
load and does not depend on awareness. Vision
Res. 51, 2048–2056. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2011.
07.023
Yang, E., Hong, S.-W., and Blake, R. (2010).
Adaptation aftereffects to facial expressions sup-
pressed from visual awareness. J. Vis. 10, 24. doi:
10.1167/6.6.1
Yang, E., Zald, D. H., and Blake, R. (2007).
Fearful expressions gain preferential access to
awareness during continuous flash suppression.
Emotion 7, 882–886. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.
7.4.882
Yang, Y. H., and Yeh, S. L. (2011). Accessing
the meaning of invisible words. Conscious.
Cogn. 20, 223–233. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.
07.005
Zhou, G., Zhang, L., Liu, J., Yang, J., and Qu, Z.
(2010). Specificity of face processing without
visual awareness. Conscious. Cogn. 19, 408–412.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.12.009
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 10 March 2014; accepted: 13 April 2014;
published online: 06 May 2014.
Citation: Stein T and Sterzer P (2014) Unconscious
processing under interocular suppression: getting the
right measure. Front. Psychol. 5:387. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.00387
This article was submitted to Consciousness Research, a
section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Stein and Sterzer. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 387 | 5
